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A novel model-based steganographic technique for JPEG images is proposed where the model, derived from heuristic assumptions
about the shape of the DCT frequency histograms, is dependent on a stegokey. The secret message is embedded in DCT domain
through an accurate selection of the potentially modifiable coeﬃcients, taking into account their visual and statistical relevancy.
A novel block measure, named discrepancy, is introduced in order to select suitable areas for embedding. The visual impact of
the steganographic technique is evaluated through PSNR measures. State-of-the-art steganalytical test is also performed to oﬀer a
comparison with the original model-based techniques.
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1. Introduction
Steganography is the art of hidden communication. Its aim is
in fact to hide the presence of communication between two
parties. Current steganographic techniques conceal secret
messages in innocuous-looking data as images, audio files,
and video files.
Following the approach in [1], the actual message
to be transmitted is called embedded message, while the
innocuous-looking message, in which the other will be
enclosed, is the cover message (cover image in case of
images). This embedding process creates a new message,
called stego message (stego image in case of images), with the
same visual and statistical appearance of the cover message
but containing the embedded message.
Modern steganographic techniques follow Kerckhoﬀs’
principle: the technique used to hide the embedded message
is known to the opponent, and the security of the stegosystem
lies only in the choice of a hidden information shared
between the sender and the receiver, called stegokey [1].
Because of their large diﬀusion among the Internet,
JPEG images are very attractive as cover messages. As a
consequence, many steganographic techniques have been
designed for JPEG, most of them embedding the message
in DCT domain by modifying the least significant bits
(LSBs) of the quantized DCT coeﬃcients. One of the first
JPEG steganographic techniques following this approach is
Jsteg [2]. Outguess [3] is not only similar to Jsteg, but
also preserves DCT global histogram by additional bit-
flipping. F5 [2] performs the embedding by decreasing the
absolute value of DCT coeﬃcients, thus preserving the DCT
histograms peak-shape. Unfortunately, all the techniques are
detected with known statistical methods [4].
Model-based steganography (MB) [5] introduces a dif-
ferent methodology, where the message is embedded in
the cover according to a model representing cover message
statistics. In [5], two image steganographic techniques (MB1
and MB2) are illustrated: MB1 models DCT AC histograms
by the generalized Cauchy distribution and embeds the
message in the cover image through an entropy decoder
driven by the model. MB2 also preserves blockiness [6]. In
[7], an ad hoc steganalytical test is developed to detect MB1.
The aim of this work is to improve the performance
of the mentioned Model-based techniques by considering a
better model and a more accurate selection of the modifiable
coeﬃcients. The peak-shaped-based (PSB) technique, here
illustrated, applies F5 heuristic principles in a Model-based
methodology. It is known that both MB1 and MB2 modeling
of every DCT AC frequency leaves a fingerprint which allows
to detect the presence of the embedded message. In fact, MB1
is detected via a model calculation followed by a goodness-
of-fit test [7]. On the other hand, PSB modeling does not
characterize strictly DCT AC histograms, but only models
in a broad sense the histograms shape. Many cover images
2 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
already present similar properties, thus making much more
diﬃcult the fingerprint discovering. Moreover, PSB model
depends on the stegokey: a simple analysis of the stego
image is not suﬃcient to perform an exact model calcula-
tion, regardless of the possible attacker. Futhermore, PSB
accurately selects the modifiable coeﬃcients by exploiting
the quantization matrix and introducing a novel parameter,
named discrepancy, measuring how much a given image
portion is suitable for embedding the hidden message.
This paper is organized as follows. Model-based
methodology is introduced in Section 2, together with
embedding and extraction algorithms. In Section 3 the PSB
technique is described and its superior performance over
original Model-based techniques is demonstrated. Conclu-
sions are drawn in Section 4.
2. PSB Steganography
The steganographic technique introduced in this work,
named peak-shaped-based steganography (PSB), is
developed following the Model-based steganography
principles exposed in Sallee’s work [5] of which for sake of
completeness, a brief outline is given in Section 2.1. Next,
PSB is illustrated and the embedding and the extraction
algorithm are described.
2.1. Principles of Model-based Steganography. Model-based
steganography was first introduced in 2003 [5]. The aim
of Model-based steganography is in characterizing some
statistical properties of the cover message in order to embed
the secret message without altering these properties. The
outline of Model-based steganography is described in the
following.
A cover message, represented as a random variable X ,
is split into two parts, Xa, that remain unaltered during the
embedding, and Xb, that is modified to carry the embedded
message. Xa is selected so as to preserve the relevant
characteristics of the cover, whereas Xb can be modified
without altering the perceptual and statistical characteristics
of the cover message. By modeling the cover message
class X according to a probability distribution ̂PX(x) it is
possible to calculate the conditioned probability distribution
̂PXb|Xa(xb|xa).
The embedded message is assumed to be a uniform
random stream of bits, which is in fact the same distribution
shown by encrypted messages. The embedding outline is
shown in Figure 1. The cover message x is split into xa
and xb, then the embedded message is processed by an
entropy decoder according to the conditioned probability
distribution ̂PXb|Xa(xb|xa). The output of the decoder is
denoted by x′b and replaces xb to form together with xa the
stego message x′.
The extraction outline is shown in Figure 2. Its structure
is very similar to the embedding scheme: the main diﬀerence
consists in the replacement of the entropy decoder by an
entropy encoder. The stego message x′ is separated in xa and
x′b. The conditioned probability distribution ̂PXb|Xa(x
′
b|xa) is










̂PXb|Xa (xb|xa) ̂PX (x)




xa x′b ̂PXb|Xa (xb|xa) ̂PX (x)
Figure 2: Model-based extraction scheme.
the model distribution. The encoder output is the embedded
message.
From now on, since the main focus of this work is on
hiding information in images, the cover messages will be
denoted as cover images.
2.2. Selection of the Modifiable Coeﬃcient Set. The JPEG
compression codes the images by dividing them in blocks,
calculating DCT coeﬃcients for every block, and then per-
forming a coeﬃcient quantization. Thus, the quantization
makes it impossible to get the original image after the
compression. This is an issue for steganography, since hiding
the message in the spatial domain should take into account
this information loss. Instead, embedding the message in
DCT domain permits to avoid this issue. Hence, Xb is
selected as a subset of quantized DCT coeﬃcients. The
modifiable coeﬃcients are accurately selected in order to
preserve the visual and the statistical characteristics of the
cover image. The selection consists in three steps: in the
first step a preliminary coeﬃcient exclusion is performed,
in the second step the maximum number of modifiable
coeﬃcients per block is calculated, and then in the final step
the modifiable coeﬃcients are selected.
2.2.1. Preliminary Coeﬃcients Exclusion. At first, some of the
coeﬃcients are excluded from embedding because of their
visual or statistical relevance. This set includes
(i) DC coeﬃcients;
(ii) zero-valued coeﬃcients;
(iii) highly quantized DCT frequencies;
(iv) unitary coeﬃcients.
DC coeﬃcients are excluded from embedding because
of their visual relevance, since they represent the mean
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luminance value of a block. Zero-valued coeﬃcients are also
excluded, since they occur in featureless areas of the image
where changes are most likely to create visible artefacts. All
the highly quantized DCT frequencies (whose quantization
coeﬃcients are greater of a threshold T = 15) are discarded
during the embedding because small changes in these coeﬃ-
cients result in large alterations in the respective dequantized
coeﬃcients. Moreover, unitary coeﬃcients (−1, +1) are also
excluded from embedding; experimental results illustrated
in Section 3.2.3 show that modifying unitary coeﬃcients
increases detectability.
The residual coeﬃcient set is denoted by x̂b. Moreover,
for every block m, let Pm denote the number of remaining
coeﬃcients in the block.
2.2.2. Coeﬃcient Modification. Every DCT coeﬃcient,
according to its value, is represented by a group and an
oﬀset. Denoting b the DCT coeﬃcient, its group g(b) is





, |b| > 1. (1)
Thus all the groups are disjoint and have two elements
which diﬀer only in one unitary value, for example,
{2, 3}, {6, 7}, {−4,−5}, and so forth.
The coeﬃcient oﬀset O(b) is defined by the following
expression:
O(b) = ∣∣b− 2·(g(b))∣∣ + 1, |b| > 1, (2)
thus oﬀsets can be only 1 or 2. PSB embeds the message
by changing modifiable coeﬃcient oﬀsets, thus only unitary
increments/decrements are possible, for example, a coeﬃ-
cient whose value is 3, after embedding could be only 2 or
3 (its group is {2, 3}). Oﬀsets are modified according to the
model.
2.2.3. Discrepancy. Some areas of the image could not be
suitable to embed the message (e.g., a periodic texture, a
sharp area, and so forth where changes could be more
detectable), but a first-order statistic modeling is not able
to discriminate such areas. A new measure is introduced,
named discrepancy, to derive the embedding suitability of
an area. The discrepancy is calculated at block layer and
expresses how much a block is similar to adjacent blocks. In
PSB, discrepancy is used to determine the maximum number
of modifiable coeﬃcients within a block.
Block B0 discrepancy is an approximation of the mean
value of the L1-distance, calculated in DCT domain, between
block B0 and block Bj , j = 1, . . . , 4, where Bj is one of the
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the ith DCT frequency. ̂b
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Figure 3: Block neighborhood.
where b
j
i is ith quantized DCT coeﬃcient of jth block. Since
the embedding modifies the exact L1-distances from the
blocks, and the sender, and the receiver must calculate the
same discrepancy in order to extract the embedded message,
discrepancy is not calculated as the exact mean, thus the
approximation (3) is required. If the block B0 is on image
border the discrepancy is calculated taking into account only
existing blocks.
Since discrepancy is larger when blocks are diﬀerent, a
block is suitable for embedding when it has a large discrep-
ancy. Numerical simulations show that the discrepancy cal-
culated in random pixel images is 4284 on average. Assuming
that steganography works better on random pixel images,
PSB divides the interval [0, 4284) in 63 subintervals labeled
from 0 to 62: [0, 68) is 0, [68, 136) is 1, . . . , [4216, 4284) is












if Sm < 4284,
63, elsewhere,
(5)
Mm represents the maximum number of modifiable coef-
ficients for block m according to discrepancy, but with-
out considering the preliminary exclusions illustrated in
Section 2.2.1. Therefore the actual maximum number of







If Mm < Pm the coeﬃcients are selected from x̂b by a pseudo
random noise generator (PRNG) seeded by the stegokey.
The class of the remaining coeﬃcients after the random
selection is denoted by xb. (Even if xb should represent
the class of the remaining coeﬃcients oﬀsets, to lighten the
notation it will denote the entire coeﬃcients.)
2.3. Message Embedding. The oﬀsets of the coeﬃcients
belonging to xb are replaced according to the message and
the model described in the next sections.
2.3.1. Coeﬃcient Permutation. The embedded message is
scattered across the image using a PRNG seeded by the ste-
gokey that permutes the order of the modifiable coeﬃcients.
As reported in [2], it represents a good solution to spread the
embedded message in the whole image, both in spatial and
in DCT domains.
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2.3.2. The Peak-Shaped Model. The peak-shaped model is a
first-order model characterizing DCT frequency histograms.
The model is dependent on the stegokey and therefore an
attacker is not able to calculate it exactly.
The model is based on two heuristic assumption derived
from F5 steganography [2]:
h(b) > h(b + 1), b ≥ 0,
h(b)− h(b + 1) > h(b + 1)− h(b + 2), b ≥ 0,
(7)
being h the histogram of a fixed DCT AC frequency and
b a positive DCT coeﬃcient. Similar properties apply on
negative coeﬃcients. For sake of simplicity the model is
described only for positive coeﬃcients on a fixed DCT
AC frequency, but equivalent steps hold also from negative
coeﬃcients and all the DCT AC frequencies.
The peak-shaped model characterizes oﬀset probabilities
for the groups by exploiting (7). Let h′ denote the stego
image histogram (for a fixed DCT AC frequency) and i > 0 a
coeﬃcient group:
h′(2i) = [h(2i) + h(2i + 1)]·Pi,




where Pi is the first oﬀset probability conditioned to group
i. Let Hg(i)
.= h(2i) + h(2i + 1), i > 0 denote the group
histogram and assuming Hg(i) > Hg(i + 1), then (7) leads
to
0.5 ≤ P(i) ≤ 1. (9)
Defining ki
.= P(i)− 0.5, the stego image histogram is
h′(2i) = Hg(i)(ki + 0.5),
h′(2i + 1) = Hg(i)(0.5− ki).
(10)
From (7) and (10), the simple algebra calculations lead to
ki >
0.5·(Hg(i)−Hg(i + 1)





)− 3k(i+1)·Hg(i + 1)
Hg(i)
. (12)
By exploiting (11) and (12) it is possible to find an
iterative algorithm to obtain ki. However, (11) and (12) are





Finally, ki is calculated recursively starting with the
largest group i following the algorithm illustrated by the flow
chart in Figure 4.
(i) For i > 5, ki = 0 since large coeﬃcients are not
statistically relevant [8]. Moreover, Figure 5 shows











i > 5 ki = 0
ki = ki+1 + 0.05
Hg (i) ≤ Hg (i + 1)
or
Hg (i) = 0
PRNG selects ki
acc. to Eq. (11)
and (12)
PRNG selects
ki ≥ 0 acc. to
Eq. (12)
i = i− 1
i > 0
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Figure 5: Oﬀset deviation from uniform distribution at the DCT
frequency (0, 1).
from a uniform oﬀset distribution at the DCT
frequency (0, 1) averaged on an image database:
groups with i > 5 show a little deviation from the
uniform distribution. In addition, it maximizes the
embedding capacity for these groups.
(ii) For i ≤ 5 if Hg(i) ≤ Hg(i + 1) or Hg(i) = 0 then ki =
ki+1 + 0.05. If (13) is not satisfied, the inferior limit
expressed by (11) is assumed to be 0. ki is derived by
a PRNG (pseudo random noise generator) seeded by
the stegokey according to (11) and (12).
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2.4. Algorithm Summary. A summary of the embedding and
the extraction algorithm is illustrated in the following.
2.4.1. Embedding Outline. The embedding algorithm follows
the steps listed as follows:
(i) a header is added to the embedded message: the
header is formed by two parts, one of fixed length
(5 bits) and one of variable length, whose dimension
is written in the fixed part. Message length is written
into the variable part;
(ii) a preliminary exclusion of non-modifiable coeﬃ-
cients (as described in Section 2.2.1) is performed
and Pm is calculated for every block m;
(iii) discrepancy is calculated according to (3), and Mm is
derived for every block m;
(iv) the maximum number of modifiable coeﬃcients per
block is calculated through (6);
(v) xb is derived by selection of the modifiable coeﬃ-
cients for each block using PRNG if Mm < Pm;
(vi) a permutation of modifiable coeﬃcients is performed
by the PRNG;
(vii) the oﬀset probabilities are calculated for every modi-
fiable coeﬃcient according to the model;
(viii) the embedded message is processed by the arithmetic
decoder illustrated in [5, 9] according to the order
established above;
(ix) the modifiable coeﬃcient oﬀsets are replaced by the
output of the arithmetic decoder.
2.4.2. Extraction Outline. The extraction algorithm follows
the steps listed as follows:
(i) a preliminary exclusion of non-modifiable coeﬃ-
cients (as described in Section 2.2.1) is performed,
and Pm is calculated for every block m;
(ii) discrepancy is calculated according to (3), and Mm is
derived for every block m;
(iii) the maximum number of modifiable coeﬃcients is
calculated through (6);
(iv) xb is derived by selection of the modifiable coeﬃ-
cients for each block using PRNG if Mm < Pm;
(v) a permutation of modifiable coeﬃcients is performed
by the PRNG;
(vi) the oﬀset probabilities are calculated for every modi-
fiable coeﬃcient according to the model;
(vii) the message is obtained by encoding the oﬀsets using
the arithmetic encoder [5, 9];
(viii) the header is inspected so as to read the message
length and to extract the message.
Table 1: PSNR test result.
PSNR min mean max
MB1 34.2 dB 40 dB 43.6 dB
MB2 35.2 dB 39.9 dB 44.3 dB
PSB 34.2 dB 40.4 dB 46.6 dB
2.5. Embedding Capacity. Embedding capacity is defined
as the maximum mean message length which could be
embedded in an image.
A modifiable coeﬃcient b can hold as many bits as the
entropy of the binary alphabet associated to its group g(b):












where Pg(b) is the probability of the first oﬀset conditioned to






To test the validity of this technique, PSB is compared to
the original Model-based steganography (MB1 and MB2,
described in [5]). Two experiments are performed: in the first
experiment the visual degradation in the image introduced
by the steganography is evaluated by calculating PSNR;
in the second experiment the state-of-the-art steganalytical
test [10] is performed to compare the robustness of the
techniques.
These test are carried out on an image database that
contains 2000 images taken from BOWS-2 database [11].
All the images are natively in lossless format and gray-
scaled. Image dimensions are 512×512 pixels. The images are
converted in JPEG format with a fixed quality factor equal to
80.
3.1. PSNR Evaluation. This experiment is performed by
embedding the same message for the three techniques and
then evaluating PSNR. The message length is diﬀerent
among the images and equals to the PSB embedding capacity,
which is the smallest among the techniques, because of PSB
unitary coeﬃcients exclusion. PSNR results are shown in
Table 1: PSB achieves slightly higher PSNR with respect to
MB1 and MB2 (0.5 dB higher); moreover PSNR is adequate
to ignore the visual degradation introduced by the three
techniques. The degradation introduced by MB2 blockiness
compensation is negligible.
3.2. Steganalytical Test. PSB detectability is compared to
MB1 and MB2 by means of the state-of-the-art steganalytical
test [10].
3.2.1. Test Overview. Following [10] the evaluation is per-
formed as follows:
(i) the image database is split in a training set (1300
images) and a testing set (700 images);
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Figure 6: Experimental results at various bpac (circle: MB1, cross:
MB2, plus: PSB).
(ii) the embedded message is the same for all the three
techniques but it diﬀers among the images. The
message length for a given image is set as a fixed
percentage of the image nonzero AC DCT coeﬃcients
(bpac-bit per nonzero AC coeﬃcient). The following
[10] experiments are performed at 0.05, 0.1, 0.15,
0.2 bpac;
(iii) no header is added to the message since it is negligible
for the aim of the test;
(iv) both the test images and the train images are analyzed
by the steganalyzer without the embedded message
(as cover images) and with the embedded message (as
stego images);
(v) the support vector machine (SVM) [12, 13] is trained
with the features of the training set scaled in [−1, +1];
(vi) the SVM parameters C and γ are estimated by a five-
fold cross-validation.
The simulation outcome is expressed by the error prob-
ability P that is the minimal total average error probability
[10] on the testing set:
P = 0.5·(PFA + PMD
)
, (16)
where PFA and PMD are the probability of false alarm and
missed detection, respectively. The aim of a steganographic
technique is in achieving a high error probability.
3.2.2. PSB Steganalysis. Figure 6 shows test results: it is
noticeable that PSB outperforms MB1 and MB2 at every
bpac. Indeed, PSB error probability is about 0.13 higher than
MB1 error probability. At 0.05 bpac PSB achieves about 0.35
error probability whereas MB1 and MB2 error probabilities
are about 0.22. At higher bpac, all the techniques get lower
error probabilities: at 0.2 bpac MB1 and MB2 are always
detected, in fact the both get 0.008 error probability, instead
of PSB error probability which is near 0.07.
Figure 7 shows the embedding impact as the mean
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Figure 7: The embedding impact on AC coeﬃcients (circle: MB1,
cross: MB2, plus: PSB).
Table 2: Comparison between PSB+1 and the other techniques:
error probability.
bpac 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
PSB+1 0.31 0.17 0.08 0.03
PSB 0.35 0.22 0.12 0.07
MB1 0.21 0.07 0.02 0.008
modified coeﬃcients and the total number of nonzero
AC coeﬃcients. PSB replaces a few more coeﬃcients than
MB1 but it gets lower visual degradation and larger error
probability. Moreover MB2 has the major embedding impact
on AC coeﬃcients due to the addictional changes to preserve
blockiness.
By comparing the embedding impact to the error
probability and PSNR it results that the embedding impact
has a minor relevance with respect to the selection of the
modifiable coeﬃcients. In fact, PSB outperforms MB1 in
error probability and gets similar PSNR with a larger embed-
ding impact. These superior performances are achieved by
taking into account discrepancy and quantization matrix in
order to select the modifiable coeﬃcients set. MB2 modifies
additional coeﬃcients to preserve a superior-order statistical
measure, but the additional coeﬃcients to be replaced are not
selected carefully, getting the worst performances.
3.2.3. Unitary Coeﬃcient Exclusion. Since unitary coeﬃ-
cients are the most common coeﬃcient values except for 0,
their exclusion aﬀects embedding capacity, but on the other
hand modifying unitary coeﬃcients increases detectability.
In fact, Table 2 shows error probability for a modified
PSB including unitary coeﬃcient values, denoted by PSB+1
(groups and model are modified to include unitary coeﬃ-
cient values). PSB and MB1 are also included for sake of
readability. It can be seen that unitary coeﬃcient values
exclusion increases PSB error probability by approximately
0.04 at bpac minor than 0.2, motivating their exclusion.
At bpac larger than 0.2 both PSB, MB1 and PSB+1 get a
zero error probability, hence it no longer makes sense the
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Table 3: Comparison between PSB+1 and PSB: modified coeﬃ-
cients/nonzero AC coeﬃcients.
bpac 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
PSB+1 0.028 0.057 0.086 0.115
PSB 0.028 0.058 0.086 0.117
Table 4: Error probability at diﬀerent quality factors.
Quality factor 70 90
bpac 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1
PSB 0.32 0.22 0.35 0.22
MB1 0.22 0.08 0.17 0.04
MB2 0.21 0.07 0.14 0.04
embedding. Therefore, the unitary coeﬃcient values impact
on embedding capacity is negligible.
Moreover, Table 3 shows the embedding impact of
PSB+1 with respect to PSB. Both the techniques achieve the
same embedding impact, whereas PSB+1 gets lower error
probability. This is a further confirm to the minor relevance
of the embedding impact with respect to the selection of
suitable coeﬃcients.
3.2.4. Error Probability at Diﬀerent Quality Factors. Usually
JPEG quality factors used in storage are included in the
interval (70, 90) that is a good trade-oﬀ between quality
and file size. Hence in the previous experiments the quality
factor is set to 80. Moreover, in [8] the quality factor is set
to 80, whereas in [10] and in [4] is set, respectively, to 75
and 70. Although the quality factor choice is arbitrary, the
steganographic detectability could be aﬀected by the diﬀerent
quantization, so some experiments are made to test PSB
detectability with diﬀerent quality factor. The results are
illustrated in Table 4. PSB outperforms MB1 and MB2 at
all the quality factors. Furthermore, PSB error probability,
together with MB1 and MB2 error probability, is aﬀected
only partially by the quality factor. In fact at 0.05 bpac the
error probabilities at the two quality factors diﬀer only in
0.03, whereas at 0.1 bpac the error probabilities are the same.
MB1 and MB2 show a larger diﬀerence, in particular MB2
error probabilities at 0.05 bpac diﬀer in 0.07. Interesting
enough, PSB undetectability improves at the quality factor
increase, instead of MB1 and MB2 that show the opposite
behavior.
4. Conclusions
A new Model-based technique, named peak-shaped-based
steganography, is introduced in order to improve the original
Model-based steganography. PSB novelty is in a more accu-
rate coeﬃcient selection, taking into account quantization
and coeﬃcient relevancy. A novel block measure, named
discrepancy, is introduced to describe how much a block
is suitable to embed a message. PSB model derives from
heuristic hypothesis about histogram shape, moreover the
model depends on the stegokey, therefore an attacker cannot
calculate exactly the model. The message is scattered in the
image by a PRNG seeded by the stegokey. The technique is
evaluated by calculating the PSNR on an image database and
performing the state-of-the-art steganalytical test described
in [10]. In each test PSB outperforms the original Model-
based techniques. It is also shown that the embedding impact
(how many coeﬃcients are modified during the embedding)
results having minor relevance with respect to the selection
of the areas in which the message is embedded.
Future work on JPEG steganography are directed toward
a superior-order modeling of the DCT coeﬃcients, by
studying Markov Random Fields and the eﬀect of image
noise in DCT domain. In particular, since unitary coeﬃcients
modification aﬀects detectability, they are actually excluded
from the embedding. However, their exclusion decreases
embedding capacity. The authors believe that if a more
accurate model is used, unitary coeﬃcients could be included
to increase the capacity with no detectability increase.
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